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Abstract 
Scotland’s political divergence from England is a key theme in late twentieth century British history. 
Typically seen in terms of the post-1979 Thatcher effect, this in fact developed over a longer timeframe, 
rooted in industrial changes revealed by analysis of the Linwood car plant in Renfrewshire. Conservatism 
and Unionism was an eminent political force in Scotland in the 1940s and 1950s. But in all general 
elections from 1959 onwards the vote share of Conservative and Unionist candidates was lower in 
Scotland than in England. From the late 1960s onwards there were also ambitions for constitutional 
change. This article breaks new conceptual and empirical ground by relating these important markers of 
political divergence to popular understanding among Scottish workers of deindustrialization. A 
Thompsonian moral economy framework is deployed. Expectations were elevated by industrial 
restructuring from the 1950s, with workers exchanging jobs in the staples for a better future in assembly 
goods. Labour governments earned a reputation in Scotland as better managers of this process than 
Conservative governments. The 1979 general election showed that Labourism was growing in popularity 
in Scotland just as its appeal faded in England. At Linwood moral economy expectations were 
compromised, chiefly by intermittent redundancy and recurrent threat of closure, which was averted in 
1975 by Labour government intervention. When the plant was shut in 1981 criticisms of UK political-




Scotland’s political divergence from England has deep roots. It was widened by the unpopularity in 
Scotland of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments first elected in 1979 but did not originate 
with them.1 The Conservative and Unionist vote share was larger in Scotland than in England in the UK 
general elections of 1945 and 1950, and only marginally smaller in those of 1951 and 1955. The electoral 
share of Conservatism and Unionism in Scotland peaked in 1955, at 50.1 per cent. At every subsequent 
general election the Conservative and Unionist share of votes was lower in Scotland than England: by 
2.5 per cent in 1959, 14 per cent in October 1974 and more than 20 per cent in 1987. Labour’s vote 
share in Scotland generally matched or exceeded its vote share in England in general elections from 
1945 to 2010. Only in October 1974 was Labour in England significantly ahead of Labour in Scotland, 
40.1 per cent of vote share to 36.3 per cent.2 
Labour was only narrowly out-voted in Scotland by Conservatism and Unionism in 1951, 1955 
and 1959. It became the dominant force from 1964 despite the emerging challenge posed by the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), which dented Labour’s vote share before the 1980s only in the February 
and October 1974 general elections. The national question was an important element in Scotland’s 
divergent political path from the 1960s. Ambitions for constitutional change were frustrated in the 
1970s, grew in the 1980s as ‘democratic deficit’ arguments were strengthened by the Thatcher effect,3 
and were partly realized in 1999 when a Scottish Parliament was established with selected powers 
retained at Westminster. Scotland’s distinct trajectory was consolidated by devolution. The SNP was 
continuously in office from 2007 and in various areas of social policy laid substantial claims to a more 
progressive agenda than UK governments, especially with the pursuit of ‘austerity’ by the Conservative-
Liberal coalition from 2010.4 Future constitutional changes remain possible, the question unresolved by 
                                                             
1 David Torrance, ‘We In Scotland’. Thatcherism in a Cold Climate (Edinburgh, 2009). 
2 Steven Kendrick and David McCrone, ‘Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline in Scotland’, Political 
Studies, 37 (1989), 589-603, with electoral data at 590. 
3 James Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union. A Study of Conservative Party Attitudes to the Union (Edinburgh, 
1990), 117-21. 
4 BBC News, Scotland Business, ‘Scottish government unveils “living wage nation” plans’, 12 November 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-41956518, accessed 13 November 2017; Scottish 
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the 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence, not least because the 2016 UK referendum on 
European Union membership reinforced Scotland’s political divergence from England. Remain was 
supported by 62 per cent of the voters and there were Remain majorities in all 32 of Scotland’s local 
authority areas.5 
The deep origins of the anti-Conservative turn in Scottish politics and long-run support for 
constitutional change are obscured in the literature by an understandable focus on the alienating results 
of Thatcherism in the 1980s.6 Two valuable exceptions can be cited. Kendrick and McCrone argued in 
1989 that changing economic and social structures had an important bearing on the ‘Conservative 
Decline’. Of note was the emergent perception from the 1950s, encouraged by the operation of regional 
policy, that Scotland was a distinct economic unit. Significantly higher levels of local authority housing 
tenure also contributed in the 1960s and 1970s to a ‘collectivist bias’ in Scotland’s politics that pre-dated 
Thatcherism. In Scotland 41 per cent of households in 1961 were local authority rentals, rising to 53 per 
cent in 1971 and 55 per cent in 1981. In England and Wales just 23 per cent were local authority rentals 
in 1961, with only modest growth to 28 per cent in 1971 and 29 per cent in 1981.7 More recently Foster 
linked the movement away from Conservatism and Unionism in Scotland in the 1960s to changes in the 
ownership and structure of industry. Coal nationalization plus the shrinkage of shipbuilding and metals, 
accompanied by a corresponding growth of new sectors controlled from outwith Scotland, drained 
‘traditional’ elites of their economic power and political influence.8 Scotland continued to be regarded 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Government, ‘Stark reality of UK Government welfare cuts’, 29 June 2017, https://beta.gov.scot/news/stark-
reality-of-uk-government-welfare-cuts, accessed 13 November 2017. 
5.BBC News, EU Referendum: Scotland backs Remain as UK votes Leave, 24 June 2016, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102; accessed 14 December 2018. 
6 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000 (London, 1999), 591-9; Christopher Harvie, No Gods and Precious 
Few Heroes: Twentieth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1998), 164; Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British 
History, 1945-1990 (Oxford, 1992), 445-9, 466-7. 
7 Kendrick and McCrone, ‘Politics in a Cold Climate’, 597, 600. 
8 John Foster, ‘The Twentieth Century, 1914-1979’, in R. A. Houston and W. W. J. Knox, eds, The New Penguin 
History of Scotland (London, 2001), 417-93. 
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by its policy-makers and broader public as an industrial nation.9 The protection of this status in the 
1950s and 1960s was increasingly led by the labour movement. Trade unions responded to lost internal 
Scottish control over economic assets by campaigning for devolution, a theme first examined by one of 
the authors in 2008.10 
This article revisits the pre-1979 industrial politics of devolution with a new reading of the car 
plant at Linwood in Renfrewshire. This was opened in 1963 by the Rootes group with investment by 
Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government. Ownership passed to the US multinational Chrysler in 
1966-67, and then to Peugeot-Citroen in 1978. Linwood grew in the 1960s with financial support from 
Harold Wilson’s Labour government. Its closure was averted by Wilson’s later government, in 1975, but 
allowed to close by Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1981. The analysis is moved forward chiefly 
in conceptual terms, although new data is also used. A Thompsonian moral economy framework is 
adopted to explain popular understanding of the industrial changes that shaped Scotland’s distinct 
political trajectory from the late 1950s. This co-existed with a social democratic policy-makers’ moral 
economy until the 1970s which accepted the state’s obligation to maintain security. The popular moral 
economy framework was developed in a 2013 discussion of the coalfields. Workers in Scotland tolerated 
policy-shaped changes to industrial employment where their longer-term economic security was 
protected, and when their trade union and political representatives were involved in managing the 
process of restructuring. The popular moral economy has wider relevance because employment changes 
in mining were predicated on the local provision of new industry.11 It is deployed here for the first time 
systematically in a study of industrial politics outwith coal. Linwood was a prime example of how moral 
economy considerations shaped industrial transition in the 1960s and 1970s. The ostensible guarantee 
of a sustainable industrial future was central to the public legitimacy of Scotland’s policy-driven 
economic changes. Conservative governments from the 1950s to the 1970s were seen in the 
communities affected by restructuring as departing from this moral bargain. The electoral popularity of 
                                                             
9 Ewan Gibbs and Jim Tomlinson, ‘Planning the new industrial nation: Scotland, 1931-1979', Contemporary British 
History, 30.4 (2016), 585-606. 
10 Jim Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester, 2008), passim. 
11 Jim Phillips, ‘The Moral Economy and Deindustrialization in the Scottish Coalfields, 1947-1991, International 
Labor and Working Class History, 84 (2013), 99-115. 
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Conservatism and Unionism was damaged as a result, especially because Labour governments, by 
contrast, were regarded as more faithful guardians of industrial employment and economic security.12 
The shift of workers in the late 1950s from coal and shipbuilding into motor vehicles and other 
forms of engineering was evidence in Scotland of early onset deindustrialization. In 1958 the 
employment share of mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction combined was 50.4 per 
cent. This slipped to 45.6 per cent in 1968 and then 39.0 per cent in 1978.13 Deindustrialization was thus 
a central feature of economic and social life for at least two decades before the Conservative 
governments led by Margaret Thatcher were first elected. The political consequences in Scotland 
underline the recent intervention by one of the authors, positioning deindustrialization as a more fertile 
meta-narrative of post-1945 British history than decline.14 The trend towards Labour in Scotland, 
particularly in the second half of the 1970s, refines the claim advanced by Robinson, Schofield, Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite and Thomlinson that there was no simple transition from social democracy to neoliberalism 
in Britain. Citing evidence from ‘lived experience’ in England in the 1970s, these authors assert that 
‘popular individualism’ was becoming a highly prominent social force across Britain.15 In Scotland, in fact 
and by contrast, the pursuit of working class economic security demonstrated the continued salience of 
collectivism. Income from industrial employment was prioritized, protected via trade union organization 
and the policy effort of a Labour government elected in 1974 which gradually become more popular in 
Scotland just as its attractions waned in England. The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) and other 
labour movement advocates saw Home Rule within the UK as a means of reinforcing the protection of 
industrial employment. Home Rule was blocked in 1979, but remained firmly on the agenda as the 
                                                             
12 Ewan Gibbs, ‘The Moral Economy of the Scottish Coalfields: Managing Deindustrialization under Nationalization 
c. 1947-1983’, Enterprise and Society, 19.1 (2018), 124-152. 
13 Digest of Scottish Statistics, 16 (October 1960), Tables 29 and 30; Digest of Scottish Statistics, 34 (October 1969), 
Tables 39 and 40; Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 10 (1981), Table 9.3. 
14 Jim Tomlinson, ‘De-industrialization not decline. A new meta-narrative for post-war British history’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 27.1 (2016), 76-99. 
15 Emily Robinson, Camilla Schofield, Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Natalie Thomlinson, ‘Telling Stories about 




political divergence between Scotland and England widened in the 1980s. The manner in which the 
Thatcher governments managed – or mismanaged – deindustrialization contributed to the further 
erosion of electoral support in Scotland for the Conservative Party, and reinvigorated popular interest in 
devolution and independence.16  
The case of Linwood exemplifies these related industrial and political changes. The promise of 
greater economic security was only partly realized. Pay disparity was one problem: wages at Linwood 
were below the national industry average until 1972. This antagonized Linwood workers who viewed the 
injustice in national as well as class terms. Redundancy was another source of tension. Labour 
governments intervened in the late 1960s and mid-1970s, protecting large-scale job losses and averting 
the plant’s shutdown when this was threatened by Chrysler. A rundown in investment, production and 
employment ensued, before Thatcher’s government accepted Peugeot-Citroen’s decision to close the 
plant in February 1981. Almost 5,000 workers were immediately made redundant. At Linwood the 
question of Scottish nationhood was more or less ever-present in debates about economic security, 
unsurprisingly, given the primacy of UK policy intervention in establishing the plant in the 1960s and 
maintaining it in the 1970s. The closure crystallized criticisms of UK policy and constitutional structures 
as well as consolidating electoral disaffection with the Conservative Party. 
 The rest of this article is structured in three parts. The linked politics of deindustrialization and 
devolution, and Labour’s growing ascendency in Scotland, are examined first. Analysis then moves to 
Linwood, exploring how its labour process cultivated moral economy feeling, contributed to popular 
understanding of deindustrialization, and advanced support for devolution. The final part shows how 
the frustration of moral economy expectations at Linwood in the second half of the 1970s and early 
1980s reinforced Scotland’s divergence from England. The article breaks new empirical as well as 
conceptual ground, using previously unused archive materials. These include government papers 
outlining various inter-actions involving ministers and civil servants, employers, trade unions and local 
                                                             
16 Andy Clark, ‘“Stealing our Identity and Taking it Over To Ireland”: Deindustrialization, Resistance and Gender in 
Scotland’, in Steven High, Lachlan MacKinnon and Andrew Perchard, eds, The Deindustrialized World: Confronting 
Ruination in Postindustrial Places (Vancouver, 2017), 331-347; Andrew Perchard, ‘“Broken Men” and “Thatcher’s 




authority representatives. Plant-level company records are also utilized, along with STUC General 
Council papers, and new interviews conducted by one of the authors with ex-Linwood workers. 
 
Deindustrialization and Devolution 
Changes in industrial employment in Scotland from the late 1950s reflected the broad objectives of 
policy-makers: greater aggregate growth and enhanced living standards. The process of restructuring 
was painful for workers made redundant in metals, shipbuilding, textiles and especially coal mining, 
where employment fell from 86,000 in 1957 to 36,000 in 1967.17 The shrinkage of the other historic 
staples was presented by policy-makers as releasing workers and capital for higher-growth alternatives. 
Public money was involved, redeveloping industrial sites, and incentivizing multinationals to locate in 
areas of above-average unemployment with rent-free factories plus grants and loans for capital 
equipment.18 The overall shrinkage of industrial employment across the 1960s was accompanied by a 
changing sectoral composition. In Lanarkshire, Scotland’s historic industrial core, coal’s share of male 
employment shrank from 15.5 per cent in 1951 to just 2.8 per cent in 1971, while engineering’s portion 
of male employment rose from 9.9 per cent to 25.6 per cent.19 The industrial remix contributed to the 
change in industry ownership and structure highlighted by Foster as a weighty factor in the waning of 
Conservatism and Unionism in Scotland.20 Concerns expressed by many in Scotland about the loss of 
local control were aggravated as the growth of new industry stalled around 1966, with early signs of the 
‘retreat’ of multinational firms that became more visible in the 1970s and the 1980s.21 
Restructuring in the 1950s and 1960s was shaped by contrasting policy-makers’ and workers’ 
moral economies. The policy-makers’ version was shared by social democrats and ‘middle way’ 
Conservatives from the 1940s to the 1960s at UK level, and emphasized the rights and responsibilities of 
                                                             
17 Miles K. Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries. An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era 
(Edinburgh, 2006), p. 20. 
18 Gibbs and Tomlinson, ‘Planning the new industrial nation’. 
19 Gibbs, ‘Moral Economy of the Scottish Coalfields’. 
20 Foster, ‘Twentieth Century’. 
21 N. Hood and S. Young, Multinationals in Retreat: The Scottish Experience (Edinburgh, 1982). 
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workers.22 The 1944 White Paper, Employment Policy, offered security, but only where workers moved 
between jobs and sectors. The rationale for trading ‘old’ industry for ‘new’, involving faster economic 
growth and rising living standards, heightened workers’ expectations.23 The popular workers’ moral 
economy that developed in Scotland from the 1950s onwards resembled that of E. P. Thompson’s 
eighteenth century English crowd, whose plebeian customs were confounded in a period of rapid 
change.24 The workers’ moral economy in post-1945 Scotland had two essential elements: industrial 
restructuring required the maintenance of individual and communal security; and was only legitimate 
where agreed by the representatives of the communities and workers involved.25 These two moral 
economies developed interactively, within the broader trend to greater state regulation of market 
forces that took place across capitalist societies in the mid-twentieth century. Understanding this 
general shift to greater social regulation of economic life was central to Karl Polanyi’s The Great 
Transformation, published in 1944. Polanyi argued that industrialization in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries had been dehumanizing. Governments encouraged market mechanisms and 
competitive forces to over-ride social imperatives and cooperation. This produced a delayed reaction in 
the twentieth century, with economic actors protecting themselves against market insecurity through 
various forms of collective action, including government regulation and trade union organization.26 
One additional element of the workers’ moral economy in Scotland can be highlighted. It had a 
distinct national character. A popular critique of UK policy-making emerged in the 1960s precisely 
because restructuring compromised security in industrial communities. The STUC supported the aim of 
industrial diversification, its officials especially keen on encouraging ‘science-based’ manufacturing, to 
improve wages and narrow the growth ‘gap’ between Scotland and England. But the STUC saw the 
Conservative government’s strategy as both over-reliant on and unacceptably generous to private 
capital. Manufacturers received public money without making concrete guarantees to meet the social 
                                                             
22 David Marquand, Mammon’s Kingdom. An Essay on Britain, Now (London, 2014). 
23 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Re-inventing the Moral economy in post-war Britain’, Historical Research, 84 (2011), 356-373. 
24 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and Present, 50 
(1971), 76-136, reprinted in Customs in Common (London, 1991), 185-258. 
25Phillips, ‘Moral Economy and Deindustrialization’. 
26 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time (Boston, 1944). 
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needs of Scotland’s citizenry for employment.27 Wilson’s Labour government responded to this trade 
union pressure with increased regional assistance to protect industrial employment between 1964 and 
1970.28 This was an important element, Kendrick and McCrone argue, in developing a sense of economic 
separateness in Scotland. The popularity of Conservatism, which emphasized the integrity of the Union, 
was eroded as a result.29 Stronger regional policy also underlined Labour’s apparently greater 
commitment to the defence of working class economic security. This was further evidenced by high-
level dialogue between union officials and the government. Wilson and Willie Ross, Secretary of State 
for Scotland, were regularly involved,30 and made policy adjustments which slowed pit closures and 
intensified job creation in the coalfields.31 
It was in this environment that National Union of Mineworkers Scottish Area (NUMSA) officials 
first pushed Home Rule onto the policy agenda of the STUC in 1968.32 The campaign for devolution was 
then sharpened as mounting unemployment and industrial closures followed the election of Edward 
Heath’s Conservative government in 1970.33 A particularly acute crisis for Conservatism and Unionism in 
Scotland resulted in 1971 from the government’s refusal to extend credit to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
(UCS). Heath and his ministers had made various references to the folly of supporting so-called ‘lame 
ducks’ in industry. Yet UCS had a busy order book and the yards were widely seen in Scotland as viable if 
                                                             
27 Glasgow Caledonian University Archives (GCUA), STUC General Council, Resolution for STUC Conference on 
Scotland’s Economy, 18 February 1962. 
28 Peter Scott, ‘Regional development and policy’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, eds, The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain. Volume III, Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000 (Cambridge, 2004), 332-
67. 
29 Kendrick and McCrone, ‘Politics in a Cold Climate’, 597. 
30 STUC, 70th Annual Report, 1967 (Glasgow, 1967), 416-30. 
31 Jim Phillips, ‘The Closure of Michael Colliery in 1967 and the Politics of Deindustrialization in Scotland’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 26.4 (2015), 551-72. 
32 STUC, 71st Annual Report, 1968 (Glasgow, 1968), 398-409. 
33 Jim Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: narratives of economic Life in Britain from 
Beveridge to Brexit (Oxford, 2017), 145-8. 
10 
 
a liquidity problem, thought to be temporary, could be overcome. The 8,000 workers refused to accept 
the inevitability of redundancy. Their famous work-in forced a government retreat and the retention of 
6,000 shipyard jobs. It also focused attention on ‘faceless’ decision-makers in Whitehall and 
Westminster, remote physically and socially from the communities affected by deindustrialization.34 In 
February 1972 the STUC convened a Scottish Assembly on Unemployment in Edinburgh’s Usher Hall, 
attended by prominent members of all political parties along with trade union officials and local 
authority representatives. James Jack, STUC General Secretary, said that the employment problem in 
Scotland arising from UK government policy demonstrated the necessity of a Home Rule Parliament in 
Edinburgh.35 
The Labour government elected in 1974 advanced the Home Rule agenda and reinforced 
regional assistance to industry. This was increasingly focused on established operations, ‘persuading’ 
firms to stay, especially in areas of rising unemployment. The defence of jobs in factories, mills, mines 
and shipyards was politically expedient with Labour facing an insurgent rival in the SNP, but the 
government also saw industrial activity as central to the realization of a range of policy goals, notably 
faster economic growth, the minimization of unemployment, and stabilization of the Balance of 
Payments.36 The personal backgrounds of Labour ministers were important too in guiding the protection 
of working class economic security through provision of industrial employment. This is often overlooked 
in political history literature which tends to differentiate prominent Labour figures by their positioning 
within ‘left-right’ or ‘militant-moderate’ spectra.37 Bruce Millan, Minister of State at the Scottish Office 
                                                             
34 John Foster and Charles Woolfson, ‘How Workers on the Clyde Gained the Capacity for Class Struggle: the Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders’ Work-In, 1971-2’, in John McIlroy, Nina Fishman and Alan Campbell, eds, British Trade Unions 
and Industrial Politics. Volume Two: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot, 1999), 297-325. 
35 GCUA, STUC General Council, Scottish Assembly on Unemployment, 14 February 1972, List of Speakers, and 
Charter of Proposals. 
36 M. Artis, D. Cobham and M. Wickham-Jones, 'Social democracy in hard times: the economic record of the Labour 
government 1974-79', Twentieth Century British History, 3 (1992), 39-53. 
37 See various contributions to John Callaghan, Steven Fielding and Steve Ludlum, Interpreting the Labour Party. 
Approaches to Labour politics and history (Manchester, 2003), and Dianne Hayter, Fightback! Labour’s traditional 
right in the 1970s and 1980s (Manchester, 2005). 
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from 1974 to 1976 and then Secretary of State for Scotland until 1979, commonly features in historical 
literature only because he became a European Commissioner in 1988, triggering a by-election in 
Glasgow Govan won by Jim Sillars of the SNP.38 But Millan played a vital role in Labour’s protection of 
economic security in Scotland, helping to establish the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1975 with 
a responsibility for cultivating industry.39 His protection of manual employment in Scotland was surely 
informed by early life in the precarious milieu of pre-Second World War Dundee, where mother worked 
in a jute mill and father in a shipyard. Millan promoted the government’s SDA agenda with Eric Varley, 
Secretary of State for Industry, who was born in the Derbyshire coalfields at the bottom of the inter-war 
depression and followed his father into mining.40 
Labour’s economic and industrial management became more popular in Scotland than in 
England after 1974. The government’s Plan For Coal stabilized employment among miners, with 
extensive investment across the Lothians and Fife,41 and the nationalization of shipbuilding in 1977 
likewise preserved a significant number of jobs on the Clyde.42 Interpretations of Thatcher’s electoral 
victory in 1979 emphasize how Labour forfeited working class support through its anti-inflationary wage 
controls. These contributed to escalating industrial action during the 1978-79 ‘winter of discontent’,43 
and damaged Labour’s prospects further by elevating the political profile of inflation and trade union 
‘power’.44 One popular history argues that Labour’s alleged economic mismanagement and industrial 
relations difficulties led Scottish voters to reject Home Rule in the 1979 referendum.45 Such a conclusion 
                                                             
38 Ewen A. Cameron, Impaled Upon a Thistle: Scotland Since 1880 (Edinburgh, 2010), 342. 
39 Peter Payne, ‘Scottish Development Agency’, in Michael Lynch, ed., The Oxford Companion to Scottish History 
(Oxford, 2001), 575-76. 
40 Brian Wilson, ‘Bruce Millan, 1927-2013, Obituary’, The Guardian, 25 February 2013; Geoffrey Goodman, ‘Eric 
Varley, 1932-2008, Obituary’, The Guardian, 29 July 2008. 
41 James R. Cowan, ‘National Coal Board: Scottish Area in the 1980s’, Mining Technology, 62 (January 1980), 20-1. 
42 Lewis Johnman and High Murphy, Shipbuilding in Britain: a political economy of decline (Exeter, 2002), 208-10. 
43 Tara Martin-López, The Winter of Discontent: Myth, Memory and History (Liverpool, 2015); John Shepherd, 
Crisis? What Crisis? The Callaghan Government and the British ‘Winter of Discontent’ (Manchester, 2013). 
44 Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, 187-205. 
45 Devine, Scottish Nation, 591. 
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is unwarranted. The government’s devolution proposals were compromised, infamously, by an 
amendment to the 1978 Scotland Bill, made by George Cunningham, the Labour MP for Islington South 
and Finsbury. This stated that the government’s proposals for a Parliament in Edinburgh would be 
annulled unless supported in a referendum by 40 per cent of the entire electorate, as distinct from 40 
per cent of those who voted. In March 1979 32.5 per cent of the electorate voted ‘Yes’ for the 
Parliament, 30.4 per cent ‘No’, and 37.1 per cent did not vote at all.46 The integrity of the result has been 
strongly questioned. The ageing electoral roll included some 500,000 persons who could not vote, owing 
to infirmity or illness, and ought to have been discounted, in which case the 40 per cent target would 
have been reduced to 1,284,754. This was only 31,252 votes more than achieved by the Yes 
campaigners.47 
From this perspective the referendum result cannot be seen as a negative verdict on the Labour 
government in Scotland in 1979. Trade unions were calling for Home Rule and providing critical support 
for the government. These two positions were consistent with each other. At the 1977 STUC annual 
conference a Parliament in Edinburgh was characterized as a mechanism for strengthening working class 
economic security, which the government’s policy agenda was also acknowledged to be defending.48 
Above average support for devolution in the referendum was recorded in the three counting areas with 
the largest concentrations of industrial employment: Central, Fife and Strathclyde. The government’s 
popularity with these Scottish electors was growing after 1974 rather than receding, in contrast to the 
position in England. In 1978 Labour won by-elections in industrial constituencies in Scotland with large 
working class electorates, Glasgow Carscadden in April and then Hamilton in May, followed by a third 
success, in Berwick and East Lothian, in October.49 This prefigured the outcome of the 1979 general 
election, when Labour consolidated its position in the central Scottish constituencies where the SNP had 
                                                             
46 Henry Drucker and Gordon Brown, The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution (London, 1980), 120-1. 
47 Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford, 1999), 188-91. 
48 STUC, 80th Annual Report, The Pavilion, Rothesay, 18-22 April 1977 (Glasgow, 1977), 794-95. 
49 Calum Aikman, ‘The Scottish by-elections of 1978’, Democracy and Devolution in the 1970s Conference, 
Academy of Government, University of Edinburgh, 26 April 2018. 
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been challenging. Labour’s share of the vote in Scotland increased from 36.3 per cent in October 1974 to 
41.5 per cent, whereas its share in England fell from 40.1 per cent to 36.7 per cent.50 
 
Linwood and the cultivation of moral economy feeling 
Linwood offers a stark illustration of the linkages between deindustrialization and devolution. The 
historical narrative of the car plant is not straightforward, with countervailing tendencies: income for 
employees and security for surrounding communities, but also frequent episodes of large-scale 
redundancy and an arduous labour process. There was tension between popular moral economy 
expectations of linear progress and the disruptive realities of car manufacturing employment. Rootes, 
the original operator from 1963, was based in the West Midlands hub of English car manufacturing, in 
Coventry. Seeking to expand in the late 1950s, the firm was guided by Harold Macmillan’s Conservative 
government to Linwood, where high volumes of a new car, the Hillman Imp, were assembled. The 
switch was facilitated by a £23 million factory, largely funded by central government. A loan of £7.85 
million from the Labour government in 1966 then enabled the manufacture on-site of car bodies, engine 
blocks and a larger number of components. Chrysler obtained a minority share in Rootes in 1964 and 
then a controlling interest in 1967. The Labour government supported this latter acquisition because 
Chrysler promised to expand production and employment.51 
Public investment was central to the cultivation of moral economy feeling at Linwood. This 
included large-scale construction of local authority housing to accommodate the new workforce.52 The 
village of Linwood became the medium-sized town of ‘Rootsville’,53 quadrupling from 2,500 in 1961 to 
10,500 in 1971, and then doubling to 23,000 in 1981. Local authority housing tenure in and around 
Linwood was high, even by Scottish standards, reinforcing the trend identified by Kendrick and McCrone 
                                                             
50 Kendrick and McCrone, ‘Politics in a Cold Climate’, 590. 
51 National Records of Scotland (NRS), SEP 4/3999, Brief for Secretary of State for Scotland’s Visit to Linwood, 
September 1977; TNA, FV 44/17, I. J. Minett, Chrysler Group Vice President to Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Minister 
of Technology, 16 January 1967. 
52 NRS, SEP 4/3991, Note on aid and assistance to Rootes, no date, but probably August 1962. 
53 Alex Neill and Margaret Neill, Interview with Valerie Wright (VW), Glasgow, 18 September 2017. 
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as a factor in the movement away from Conservatism and Unionism in the 1960s.54 In the Renfrew local 
authority area 47.8 per cent of households rented in the public sector in 1961, rising to 56.2 per cent in 
1971 and 63.1 per cent in 1981. Public housing initiatives contributed to the growth of new communities 
around Linwood. These were built politically on the promise of future economic security, with a 
relatively high proportion of nuclear families, including many drawn from Glasgow.55 ‘They all had two 
point five kids’, remembers Joe Reilly, a Glasgow migrant and long-term Linwood worker.56 In December 
1975 only 12 per cent of the workforce was 50 or older, compared with over 25 per cent for the 
economically-active male population of Strathclyde Region as a whole. Seven in ten workers lived in 
Linwood or neighbouring Paisley and Johnstone, and two in ten travelled daily from Glasgow. In Linwood 
half the employed population worked for Chrysler.57 
Central and local government planners were advised by Rootes in 1961 that 11,000 workers 
would be employed in car manufacturing at Linwood by the early 1970s, with a further 5,000 producing 
vehicle bodies at the established and adjacent Pressed Steel site.58 Total employment never reached this 
level, peaking intermittently at around 9,000 in 1965, 1970, 1974 and 1977. There were intervening 
waves of damaging redundancy: 1,000 in October 1966,59 another 1,000 by increments in 1971,60 and 
more than 2,000 late in 1974. With a three-day week operating in the first quarter of 1975 the STUC 
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argued for nationalization, to stabilize production and employment. Normal working resumed in June, 
but a further short-time spell was announced in September, with five days of redundancy in fifteen and 
a seven-day lay-off in October.61 Moira MacMillan, a data manager, remembers large numbers of 
women being deployed in manufacturing trim for car interiors, and on the assembly lines too by 1975.62 
So redundancy was a shared frustration for female and male workers. Short-time compelled many to 
leave the plant. A family ‘cannae live on three days’ wages’, recalls Barry Brown, who traded Linwood 
for public sector employment as a painter-decorator in 1975.63 Between mass redundancies Chrysler 
deployed another response to falling demand, according to former employees, wilfully provoking strike 
action by breaching agreements. Sixty cars an hour were produced at Linwood in the 1970s: a week’s 
loss of production enabled Chrysler to move accumulated stock while making significant labour cost-
savings.64 
Motor manufacturing in the UK generally operated in response to cyclical markets, and on this 
basis was not well placed to provide employment stability. In periods of slack employers habitually 
made workers redundant.65 Workers’ moral economy expectations of improvement were frustrated by 
this insecurity, and the industry’s strenuous labour process. Ex-skilled engineers, shipyard workers and 
miners struggled to adjust to the monotony at Linwood, where 60 per cent of the employees in 1975 
were in semi-skilled assembly or machine shop work.66 The existence of a ‘culture clash’ between the 
heritage of craft production and the new reality of automated assembly figures in the historical 
literature.67 It likewise features in the testimonies of former workers.68 Joe Reilly’s narrative is organized 
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around his struggle to exert personal agency as an assembly line welder and shop steward seeking 
improved working conditions. Strikes are remembered as the inevitable consequence of the culture 
clash: ‘people wouldn’t take rubbish’.69 Disputes arose where workers attempted to replicate the effort-
rationing of craft labour, to limit production and improve earnings.70 Management saw restricted output 
as ‘fundamental breach and wrongful repudiation’ of the employment contract. Unofficial strikers were 
often dismissed, exacerbating tensions within the plant, including those between union members and 
their representatives who were struggling to maintain harmonious relations with the employer.71 Union 
stewards tended to be men with periods of long service. John Carty of the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers (AUEW), convenor of the plant’s stewards, worked at Linwood continuously from 
around 1962. By 1977 Tommy Boyle of the AUEW and Jimmy Livingstone of the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU) had both been at Linwood for fourteen years, almost as long as Carty.72 But 
more generally Linwood conformed to the broader UK trend, with turnover higher in development area 
car factories than established plants in the Midlands.73 At Linwood attrition was highest in the ‘Crazy K’ 
assembly block,74 where TGWU members exhibited greater militancy than AUEW members in the 
engineering shops.75 
Grievances arising from the labour process were compounded by pay disputes. Wages 
compared favourably with those in other Clydeside manual employment sectors. An ex-Lanarkshire coal 
miner remembers discussing earnings with fellow football supporters in the late 1960s. Linwood 
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assembly workers were getting £35 a week, 50 per cent more than the miner’s £22-10s.76 Skilled men 
were earning 4d an hour more than their equivalents in shipbuilding in 1968, a weekly premium of 
almost £1.77 When Barry Brown joined the assembly floor in 1970 he exceeded his painter-decorator’s 
weekly wage by £14.78 But Rootes and then Chrysler were still paying Linwood workers below the 
industry average, seeking harmonious relations with other engineering employers on Clydeside,79 and 
compensation for the additional supply costs of operating in the ‘periphery’. In 1972 Gilbert Hunt, 
Managing Director of Chrysler UK, in confidential evidence to the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of 
the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, said that the extra burden of manufacturing at Linwood 
from 1963 to 1970 was equivalent to double the sum received in regional assistance.80 
Pay disparity highlighted a central fissure between the moral economies of UK policy-makers 
and Scottish workers. The policy-makers’ approach accepted that regionally-assisted employers could 
access labour at sub-national average rates, to absorb unemployed workers in development districts 
without overly distorting local labour markets or elevating production costs for inward-investing firms.81 
For workers, on the other hand, pay disparity was a source of tension in development areas in England 
and Wales as well as Scotland in the 1960s.82 Indeed, a key finding of Beynon’s pioneering study of car 
assembly workers, first published in 1973, was that large corporate employers in the industry habitually 
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cultivated competition between their employees at different factories.83 But as with redundancies, the 
earnings grievance at Linwood was expressed by workers in terms of Scottish particularity. This 
contributed to a quasi-colonial narrative of resistance among workers, who resented their status as 
‘kilted coolies’.84 Ex-worker testimonies emphasize mutual resentments between Linwood and the 
Midlands, and the privileging of production in England over Scotland.85 Meeting Chrysler management 
at Linwood in May 1970 Jack of the STUC said that trade unionists would not accept the argument that 
industry could only operate profitably in Scotland through ‘a substantial differential in terms of 
earnings’. The STUC officials were supporting a workforce claim for parity.86 After a lengthy strike this 
was broadly attained in 1972.87 Linwood management advised the Economic Planning Department of 
the Scottish Office (SEPD) in 1975 that this removed the chief single source of workforce discontent at 
the plant. Strikes had become less frequent, and were triggered by national rather than local disputes.88 
Moral economy feeling among workers at Linwood, and the urgency of the Scottish national 
question, was nevertheless heightened by a serious crisis in the early winter of 1975-76. The Labour 
government had been in dialogue with Chrysler for several months, starting with a private dinner in 
London between Wilson and the firm’s US President, Lynn Townsend, and Chairman, John Riccardo.89 
The government’s Central Policy Review Staff were preparing a report which pointed to substantial over-
capacity in UK car manufacturing. The loss of Chrysler, with UK market share falling from seven to five 
per cent in the course of 1975, was tolerable and even desirable. Government support could then be 
concentrated on other enterprises, especially the quasi-nationalized British Leyland.90 Literature on the 
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industry broadly underscores this report’s conclusion that rationalization was required for greater 
overall profitability, although higher capital investment than was ultimately achieved in ‘under-
performing’ plants such as Linwood would have improved their production position.91 Chrysler 
responded to these competitive pressures by threatening to leave the UK unless it received substantial 
government assistance, to absorb losses and finance the transfer of an established model, the Avenger, 
from Ryton to Linwood, where a new make of car would also be established. A total of 21,000 jobs in 
Chrysler establishments in Scotland and the Midlands were at stake.92 
Varley, Secretary of State for Industry, and Jack Jones, TGWU General Secretary, both opposed 
support for Chrysler, which they viewed as a corporate blackmailer.93 Willie Ross countered in Cabinet, 
arguing the difficult employment situation in Scotland made the investment politically-unavoidable. 
Some 5,700 jobs would be lost at Linwood, jeopardizing steel and coal industry employment at 
Ravenscraig in Lanarkshire and Polkemmet Colliery in West Lothian. Ross criticized Jones and other UK 
union officials who opposed intervention because it would extinguish the jobs of Avenger assemblers in 
the West Midlands while creating new opportunities in Scotland. A shift of employment from Scotland 
to England was far more common, he noted, and usually took place without complaint from English 
workers and trade unionists while generating ‘considerable bitterness in Scotland’. He also pointed out 
that the SNP had won eleven seats in the October 1974 general election and come second to Labour in 
thirty others, including eleven of the fifteen adjacent to Linwood. Nationalists would cast the plant’s 
closure as a prime ‘symbol of UK mismanagement of the Scottish economy’.94 
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Wilson, who retired several months later to be succeeded as Labour leader and Prime Minister 
by James Callaghan, was persuaded by these political considerations. He nevertheless detailed Harold 
Lever, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to construct a formal case focusing solely on the economic 
benefits, including high-value exports to Iran.95 A projected £162 million in grants and loans to Chrysler 
over four years was agreed. This was approved in the House of Commons by a majority of 21, and only 
with support from the eleven SNP members because ten Labour members abstained.96 Although 
transferring the Avenger to Linwood, the deal still involved significant redundancy, with 2,000 leaving 
voluntarily in January 1976.97 Linwood stewards argued for nationalization as an alternative to both 
closure and financial support for Chrysler, as did the STUC General Council.98 There was disquiet also in 
the community around the plant. ‘The Chrysler “rescue” doesn’t look quite such a piece of benevolent 
charity when viewed from the Ponderosa Bar in the middle of Linwood’, wrote Pearson Phillips in The 
Guardian. ‘To a production work force which is to be cut in half, it seems a funny way to be rescued’, he 
added, anticipating future difficulties for the government and the Labour MP for Renfrew West, Norman 
Buchan.99 Yet Buchan was re-elected in the context of Labour’s Scottish recovery in 1979 with a 
substantially increased share of the vote, up to 44.5 per cent from 38.5 per cent in October 1974. The 
SNP’s vote was halved from 28.6 per cent to 13.1 per cent. The effects of the rescue – the Labour 
government defending manual employment in difficult economic and political circumstances – were 
clear, although Buchan enjoyed a strong local following based on a reputation for personal integrity and 
dedicated public service.100 
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Linwood and the frustration of moral economy expectations 
The preservation of Linwood in 1975 intensified moral economy feeling and popular scrutiny of UK 
policy-making in Scotland. Two elements of the rescue were especially important. First, there was 
Chrysler’s commitment to a new model at Linwood, later named the Tango. This was spelt out in the 
firm’s Planning Agreement with the government of March 1977. Some £11.7 million of Chrysler UK’s 
proposed £75 million expenditure over the next three years was allocated to producing the Tango at 
Linwood from 1979.101 The Avenger rolled off the production line from August 1976. A remodelled 
Sunbeam, successor to the Imp, followed in September 1977, but government ministers and officials 
shared the view of many Linwood workers that the Tango would be essential to the plant’s longer-term 
future.102 Second, Chrysler conceded a form of company-wide consultation with union representatives. 
The 1977 Planning Agreement, required in return for the government investment, also aligned with 
Labour’s industrial democracy agenda, with the Bullock committee examining worker directors in large 
manufacturing firms. Deindustrialization was central to union support for this agenda. Worker directors 
could arrest disinvestment and the elimination of unionized jobs in manufacturing.103 Multinationals, the 
Confederation of British Industry and the Conservative opposition combined to repel the Bullock 
majority report recommendation of union-channel worker directors,104 but there was business support 
for bottom-up employee participation. This could involve greater consultation short of joint partnership, 
in workplaces rather than boardrooms, and involving smaller scope issues, such as speed of production 
rather than capital investment.105 The terms of Chrysler’s Employee Participation Programme (EPP) were 
established in March 1976. Chrysler executives told union representatives and government officials that 
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partnership would enable better decisions to be made and reduce industrial conflict.106 A short film was 
produced, Building the New Chrysler. Carty appeared, saying that union and workforce ambition to 
improve production had accelerated the introduction of the Avenger.107 
The promise of partnership and growth was unfulfilled, however. In November 1976 George 
Lacy, Chrysler UK’s Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, claimed that a lack of cooperation 
from workers had resulted in an ‘embarrassing’ loss of sales. A ‘return’ to ‘efficient “steady-state” 
management’ was required, meaning ‘well-proven’ company oversight of ‘budget, output and 
quality’.108 This renewed emphasis on managerial prerogative frustrated moral economy expectations at 
Linwood and prefigured an industrial relations crisis in the autumn of 1977. Millan, who succeeded Ross 
as Secretary of State for Scotland in 1976, was advised by officials that production difficulties at Linwood 
stemmed from Chrysler’s emerging reluctance to build the Tango there. This lowered morale among 
workers and compromised their effort.109 Visiting Linwood in September 1977, Millan found that Carty 
and other workforce representatives were ‘full and frank’ and ‘constructive’, but he was greatly 
‘disturbed’ when one of the managers told him that the Tango could be made at Ryton instead.110 A 
company-wide meeting of the Planning Agreement Working Party followed in Coventry, where Carty 
claimed the Tango was a ‘dead duck’, and management representatives conceded that design difficulties 
were delaying its introduction. Carty asserted in moral economy terms that the firm had a plain 
obligation to establish the Tango at Linwood as replacement for the Avenger in 1979.111 
Within two weeks of this fractious Working Party meeting there was a lengthy stoppage at 
Linwood. Chrysler later claimed – disingenuously – that this was the trigger for relocating the Tango to 
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Coventry.112 Management tried to change the supervision of workers in the K block, to identify faults 
earlier on the line,113 but ignored existing consultation procedures.114 The plant was entirely shut down 
within 24 hours as all other workers stopped in solidarity with inspectors who were sent home for 
refusing the new arrangements.115 Management then broadened the argument, insisting that 
agreement be reached on a lengthy list of issues before allowing a return to work.116 James Milne, Jack’s 
successor as STUC General Secretary, was advised by stewards that the company was prepared to close 
Linwood permanently rather than cede defeat. The shutdown lasted three weeks while Cabinet 
ministers and national trade union officers negotiated with Chrysler executives and the stewards.117 
Shortly after a resumption of work, secured by Milne on pre-dispute conditions on 7 November,118 
Chrysler announced that the Tango would be produced at Ryton. This vital strategic decision was taken 
without the management-union Planning Agreement Working Party,119 compounding the company’s 
violation of the 1975 rescue plan according to Millan.120 
In June 1978 Varley visited Linwood. The mood among managers and stewards was optimistic, 
with a new model – the Horizon – now promised for 1984.121 The struggle for control was nevertheless 
relentless. Within two weeks there was another sizeable stoppage, following management’s decision to 
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curtail the hot environment relief time from fifteen to ten minutes, said to be the industry norm.122 
Employees suspected that management was forcing a production break to run down unsold stock but 
could not concede the relief time which had been hard won through earlier collective action.123 A 
compromise was arrived at by national union officers and Chrysler UK executives, guided by Varley and 
his officials at the Department of Industry, and all workers restarted on 7 August.124 That same day, 
however, Riccardo told Varley in London that Chrysler was selling its UK operations to Peugeot-Citroen 
(PSA). Varley was perturbed by the suddenness of this turn of events, and the implied abandonment by 
Chrysler of its Planning Agreement obligations.125 PSA was compelled by the government to sign a 
‘Declaration of Intent’ with a commitment to maintaining Linwood, although this was ‘not legally 
binding’ and qualified by an important caveat: ‘to the extent consistent with prevailing market 
conditions’.126 PSA’s assurances were nevertheless important in generating workforce, union and 
political anger as the loss of 2,500 jobs in the twelve months to October 1980 was followed by the 
announcement of total closure in February 1981 with 4,800 redundancies.127 
Linwood’s ending took place within a much-changing political environment. In contrast to its 
Labour predecessor, Thatcher’s Conservative government did not accept an obligation to defend 
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employment.128 In the sphere of industrial relations it also embarked in a new direction. Pursuing the 
right of management to manage, unchallenged by authoritative trade union voice, was a central 
Thatcherite aim.129 This diminished the potential for government intervention when firms contemplated 
disinvestment and large-scale redundancies. Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry from 1979 
to 1981, opposed government subsidy of industrial production and employment.130 The new approach 
startled STUC officials when they met Joseph for the first time in December 1979. The Secretary of State 
asserted that the type of intervention sought by the STUC in support of industry had been ‘tried and 
found wanting over the last 15 years’. It was not the government’s responsibility, he added, to subsidize 
goods which consumers were not purchasing.131 In the winter of 1980-81 government inactivity 
contrasted vividly with the efforts made by the Labour government to keep Linwood open in 1975. With 
PSA moving towards announcing the closure of Linwood, Joseph met management representatives 
along with MPs from affected constituencies. ‘Sir Keith was extremely reluctant to agree to do anything 
at all’, the official minute recorded.132 Gavin McCrone, economic adviser to government ministers in 
Scotland in the 1970s and 1980s, remembers Scottish Office colleagues insulating their territorial 
interests from public expenditure cuts in the early 1980s.133 But with Linwood no obvious dissent was 
expressed at the SEPD, where officials claimed that closure would have limited wider implications. The 
multiplier effect, accentuated by the same department in 1975, was now said to be insignificant, with 
only 260 of 5,630 jobs at the Gartcosh and Ravenscraig steel mills affected, and perhaps 1,000 jobs in 
supply firms threatened.134 
At the STUC General Council, meeting Linwood union officials and stewards, George Bolton, Vice 
President of the NUMSA, warned that closure would reduce demand for Scottish steel and coking coal. 
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The government’s deflationary economic policy was the chief source of pressure on industrial 
employment and had to be resisted through ‘concerted trade union action’, starting at Linwood.135 But 
the majority of Linwood workers were unwilling to fight. ‘Open the box’, many shouted from the floor of 
a mass meeting in March 1981, discussing whether to accept redundancy or campaign to keep Linwood 
open. This was an ambiguous reference to the Thames Television gameshow, Take Your Pick, popular in 
the 1960s, where contestants would gamble accumulated prize money by opening a box in the hope of 
winning a superior prize, a valuable foreign holiday, for instance. At Linwood in 1981 ‘open the box’ had 
the opposite meaning: avoid gambling on an uncertain future in the factory by accepting the closure and 
taking the redundancy money, which for many amounted to a year’s wages.136 This was supported by a 
reported ratio of 2:1. The transient nature of car assembly employment, at least compared with craft 
production in shipbuilding, is emphasized as a significant factor in this outcome by one ex-Linwood 
employee.137 
 Linwood workers placed a mock coffin on top of the last car making its way along the assembly 
line.138 The closure symbolized the ending of large-scale industrial employment more broadly in 
Scotland. From 1978 to 1988 the share of employment in industrial categories fell from 39 per cent to 
28 per cent.139 Across all sectors the rate of employment among men aged 16-64 in Scotland fell from 
77.6 per cent in March 1981 to 63 per cent in March 1991. In the same decade there was a marginal 
increase in the employment of women aged 16-64, from 55.7 to 57.7 per cent, although this was 
increasingly concentrated in lower paid services.140 Job losses in manufacturing accelerated after 1981 in 
other parts of the UK, but there were peculiar political consequences in Scotland given the historic 
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dependence on industrial employment. A further shrinkage of support for Conservatism followed the 
defeat of the miners’ strike against colliery closures in 1984-85.141 While re-elected across the UK with a 
majority of 102 in 1987, the Conservative government lost eleven of its twenty-one seats in Scotland.142 
In Paisley South, a new constituency close to the site of Linwood and first contested in 1983, Buchan 
increased Labour’s vote share from 41.4 per cent to 56.2 per cent. The STUC re-energized the campaign 
for Home Rule, helping in 1988 to establish the Scottish Constitutional Convention which brought non-
Conservative political parties together with various civic, social and religious forces. This agreed the 
foundations of the Scottish Parliament that convened in 1999.143 
 
Conclusion 
The crumbling of support for Conservatism in the 1980s and renewed interest in the Scottish national 
question were rooted in debates about the fairness of economic changes that developed from the 
1950s. Deindustrialization was seen by labour movement critics in Scotland in political-constitutional 
terms. Defects in the management of deindustrialization in the 1960s and 1970s were associated by the 
STUC with the incapacity of UK policy-makers to recognize and accommodate Scotland’s distinct 
economic and social problems. Specifically, the economic security of manual workers and working class 
communities was jeopardized by the stagnation of new job creation after the peak of employment in 
the staple industries in the late 1950s and manufacturing in the mid-1960s. This stimulated demands for 
Home Rule, led initially by coal miners but supported by other trade unionists adversely affected by 
industrial job losses. From this trade union perspective devolution was seen as a valuable potential 
means of arresting industrial disinvestment and protecting working class economic security. 
After 1979 the trade union case for devolution grew stronger. Moral economy considerations 
were vital. From the 1950s to the 1970s rival policy-making and popular moral economies had co-
existed, mutually reinforcing each other. Workers had expectations of economic stability and a 
sustainable industrial future, cultivated by the careful manner of deindustrialization’s management. The 
Thatcher governments violated these expectations by abandoning the commitment to protecting 
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industrial production and employment. The political costs of industrial closures and job losses in the 
1980s were therefore incurred by the Conservative Party. Labour gained ground in Scotland, where the 
Wilson and Callaghan governments’ defence of industrial employment was popular. Much like members 
of Thompson’s eighteenth century English crowd, inhabitants of deindustrializing communities in 
Scotland in the 1980s had a highly developed sense of social justice being overturned by economic 
changes that were regarded as illegitimate. The feeling was especially acute in communities which had 
traded the valued assets of coal, metals and shipbuilding in the 1960s to make way for the multinational 
assembly goods manufacturing which incrementally disappeared in the 1980s. 
These politics of devolution were highly visible at Linwood, established with government 
financial support in 1963 as a means of both mitigating and further advancing the contraction of 
established industry in west-central Scotland. Moral economy feeling among Linwood’s workers was 
nurtured by the exchange of industrial employment which had taken place, and the substantial 
movement of population on the promise of a secure future. The history of the plant was highly 
problematic. Successive employers – Rootes, Chrysler, and finally PSA Peugeot-Citroen – frustrated the 
workers’ moral economy on three related fronts. First, the autonomy of Scottish craft labour was 
challenged by assembly line production, with frequent disputes arising as the employers sought to 
impose their managerial prerogative. Chrysler’s commitment in 1975-76 to industrial democracy and 
employee participation proved ephemeral. Second, wages at the plant were higher than the local 
market average but until 1972 below the UK rates for car manufacturing. This contributed to grievances 
at Linwood that combined Scottish national resentment with class antagonism. Third, and perhaps most 
important, employment stability and economic security were recurrently compromised by waves of 
redundancy, periods of short-time working, and intermittent threats of closure. At Linwood, as 
elsewhere in Scotland, Labour governments earned a reputation for managing this state of 
precariousness more sensitively than Conservative governments. Labour politicians defended industrial 
employment, and attempted to implement the trade union movement’s ambitions for a devolved 
Scottish Parliament that would bolster working class economic security. Scotland’s distinct political 
trajectory accelerated after 1979, but was embedded in the popular moral economy interpretation of 
the longer history of deindustrialization since the 1950s. 
 
